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FACTS
Respondent's brief contains statements which are in error and
require clarification or verification by Appellant for the benefit of the
Court. Respondent states in its brief at page 5, "the Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order against Reichert on March 28, 1984." This
statement is incorrect. Regional Sales, as Plaintiff, filed a Motion for
Preliminary Injunction with the trial court. (R 13-1J5) The Motion for
Preliminary Injunction was denied after evidentiary hearing before Judge
Croft. (See Memorandum Decision R. 48-50, R 61-66)
The record regarding and chronology of Defendant's motions to
amend his counterclaim need clarification. The first Amendment to
Counterclaim of Defendant was filed on April 30, 1987 (R. 132-133), and
was for the purpose of adding the affirmative defense of failure of
consideration based on the documentary information obtained at the
deposition of Helen Kiholm taken shortly before on April 23, 1987. The
documentation consisted mainly of the corporate tax returns and earnings
of Regional Sales Corporation, which documents were presented in the trial
before Judge Russon. Reichert deemed the Amendment to the
Counterclaim appropriate in view of paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Complaint
which alleged "all conditions precedent to Defendant's liability under the
agreement have been performed or have occurred." ^Paragraph 9 was
summarily denied, R. 29, paragraph 4 of Answer) Inherent in this
allegation is the argument that Regional Sales alleged full performance on
its part under the 1979 agreement. Denial of that paragraph, and the
claims of the Counterclaim as first submitted placed the performance of
Regional Sales under the alleged 1979 agreement at issue. The
documentation obtained at the deposition of Helen Kiholm, which had not

been previously available although it had been requested by Defendant,
clearly indicated that Regional Sales had failed to pay the 40% commission
earned by Mr. Reichert from 1977 through 1983, as required by the
alleged agreement of 1979. This argument was clearly set forth in the
Amendment to Counterclaim. (R. 132)
Respondent, Regional Sales, at page six of its brief takes issue with
the statement of Reichert regarding the basis upon which Judge Russon
recused himself. Regional Sales states that Reichert's contentions are not
true, to wit: Judge Russon recused himself "due to the evasive conduct of
Mrs. Kiholm while testifying and the responsive conduct of counsel." For
whatever importance this issue may have to this Court, Mr. Reichert calls
attention to the record in this matter, beginning at the transcript page
number 77:
THE COURT:
Mr. Fankhauser, I want you to
wait for the witness. You keep speaking over.
Let me say this: If you are trying to make the
trier of fact understand what you are trying to
get at, you are not doing too red hot of a job.
You cut in so. Then, I cannot understand what
the answer is, and I don't know what she has said.
I have gone on like this for a page an a half. You
need to ask questions and let her answer.
FANKHAUSER: What I am having a problem
with, the witness does not respond to the question.
She gives me a narrative.
THE COURT:
I have heard a lot of narratives
in Court and that certainly is objectionable if she
does that. She needs to answer your question.
Sometimes when she is answering your question,
she gets about four words out, you cut her off and
go right on to something else. I won't argue with
you. Move on and do what I am saying.
4

FANKHAUSER: I am explaining why "
doing what I am doing.

i

THE COURT:
Let's call a recess and I will see
both counsel in chambers.
- ». ,

in chambers, Judge Russon made an offer to

recuse himself from the , ase, as substantiated at page 72 of the
^ follows:
THE COURT:
We had a meeting in chambers.
I have offered to Mr. Fankhauser as settlemeru
recusal. He has asked me to recuse myself and I
will do that. The case is terminated *t rhi« noint.
Based upon the transcript of the proceedings before Judge Russon, as cited,
the statement of Respondent and footnote 1 of its br\--r ire incorrect
ng the recusal of Judge Russon, Def<

iew moi

to Amend Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim, pursuant to Rule 15,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which motion was timely filed. At that
time Delendant proposed amending his Answer and Counterclaim to
include failure of consideration and, for the first time, the affirmative
defense of hre

,n I >K I'U> '>I > I Ins motion ',»,as filed

.?'.! 1987, several months prior to liuil before Judge Brian.
Mr. Reichert wishes to clarify the giving of jury instructions in
response to the arguments of Regional Sales th
court failed to give instruction number eigh

>r when 11
-miction number eight is

found at R. 18"" 1 "hi<-> requested instruction was submitted on December
request*.
•J -*••*«'!> December io 1987. and requested that its instruction
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number eighteen be given if the court refused to give number eight. The
court below thereafter made the substitution as requested. Therefore, the
instruction actually given to which Regional Sales objects pertaining to
liquidated damages is its own instruction.
Finally, regarding Regional Sales arguments for attorney's fees, this
Court should carefully note several important deficiencies in Mr. Roe's
affidavit for fees. (R. 313-315) Paragraph four of the affidavit
acknowledges that he was unable to obtain the actual hours worked during
the period of January 24, 1984 to December 31,1985, while he was at Roe
& Fowler. Instead, he "estimated" the figure of 42 hours, all of which
apply to the failed attempt at an injunction and related matters. Mr. Roe
states that his customary rate is $130 per hour, but fails to even allege that
this is a reasonable rate for the services performed, the complexity of the
case, or that the rate is reasonable when compared to other rates in the area
for similar work. Instead, he simply states a self-interested opinion that the
hours billed and the rate charged are reasonable.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
Judge Brian's Failure to Grant Reichert's Motion to Amend the
Counterclaim, made pursuant to Rule 15. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Constituted an Abuse of Discretion
As has been previously argued, Judge Brian's failure to grant
Reichert's Motion to Amend Counterclaim constituted an abuse of
discretion . The denial of the motion was not in the interests of justice and
did not promote a trial on the merits of the case, but summarily dismissed
important claims of Reichert for affirmative relief. Furthermore, Judge
Brian, relying on the previous ruling of Judge Russon regarding the
6

amendment of Reichert's Counterciai ..

^e into consideration, Kit!"

fact that Judge Russon, had not ever ruled on Reicheifs claim,, of breach, of

a further abuse of discretion

I he motion to amend should have been

granted, and Reichert should have had his day in court
granting ml I In inolion SMIIIIII have HimiiialH

|H

Certainly, the

, , , K i%l n

otenlial

ion regarding the use of parol evidence n; ijan.m* whether or not the
1979 agreement was a sham. The jury verdict should stand, or in the
s
counterclaim for breach of contract, which remedy the Court of Appeals
improperly denied.
I H3I1 i I Ill
Regional Sales incorrectly asserts that its performance under the
1979 agreement was not at issi le

This Court may note that the bulk, of Mr.*

Reichert's defense and case rested upon claims that the performance of
Regional Sales was at issue, and that they had not performed under the

nil mi effort Hi roiih J (he prima facie case of Regional Sales foi breach of
contract on his pari, The breach of regional Sales was committed from
WO
i \

* pay the 40% commissions to Reichert in that time, but

' *?d to operate under the previous oral agreement to the end of 1,982,
VVMIVII |PM>vided thai Rrii hnl would In |MIN1 A Siiliiy

SMIH1 lln hirrichof

Regional Sales preceded that alleged against Reichert, and since the
agreement of 1,979 was a sham, Reichert was relieved of performance

arguments before, during and after trial. Regional Sales was therefore not
7

entitled to damages at all. Such a denial of damages going to Regional
Sales constitutes a straightforward "negative" defense by Reichert.
Negative defenses do not require separate pleading, as do affirmative
defenses. In this sense, set off and recoupment may or may not require
separate pleading, depending on the manner of their use. If they are used
to seek an affirmative recovery, they require a separate pleading. If they
are used in a purely defensive manner, i.e., to address the prima facie
elements of Plaintiffs case, or used to defend against the allegations raised
by Plaintiff, then they do not require separate pleading under rule 8(c),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Professor Moore states, regarding pleading of "affirmative defenses"
not listed in Rule 8(c):
An analysis of Plaintiffs Prima Facie case is
necessary in applying the [clause in Rule 8(c)
which requires affirmative pleading of "any other
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative
defense"]. Any matter that does not tend to
controvert the opposing parties prima facie case
as determined by applicable substantive law
should be pleaded, and is not put in issue by a
denial made pursuant to Rule 8(b).
Moore. Pleading and Procedure, at 8-182. commenting on Rule 8, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Therefore, the definition of a negative defense is one raised by mere
denials, which address the prima facie claims of Regional Sales. Insofar as
set off and recoupment were used by Reichert to mitigate or deny the
damages claimed by Regional Sales, they constituted negative defenses
raised by Reichert's denials. Evidence supportive of these denials was
properly admitted, even though the same evidence could be also used to
8

support an affirmative claim for relief. The verdict of the jury was not
therefore tainted by the admission of evidence by Reichert relating to the
failure of performance of Regional Sales. The Court of Appeals erred in
finding that such evidence was improperly admitted and in holding that it
confused the jury, and in further holding that Reichert, on remand, would
not be allowed to use such evidence, even in a purely defensive manner.
If, contrary to Reichert's contentions, this Court holds that Reichert
was required to affirmatively plead breach of contract and that his motion
to include this in his counterclaims was properly denied, we must examine
the effect of a failure to plead. Professor Moore states:
If an affirmative defense is not pleaded it is
waived to the extent that the party who should
have pleaded the affirmative defense may not
introduce evidence in support thereof.
Moore at 8-184.
If Reichert failed to plead an affirmative defense in claiming set off
and recoupment, nevertheless, he was free to use any and all evidence
provided by Regional Sales to advance his claims, and would have been
limited only to the extent that he attempted to introduce his own
independent evidence.
Regional Sales contentions that the admission of exhibit "I"
constituted error are not well founded in view of the fact that they were all
based upon evidence provided by Regionals Sales which was previously
admitted. Exhibit "I" (see T. 175-182) was based upon invoices maintained
by Regional Sales for the year 1981. Exhibit 10, introduced by Regional
Sales also involved the use of those invoices used by Reichert. (T. 219-227,
especially 221 and 226-7) Therefore, Exhibit "I" is merely a reliance upon
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evidence before the jury in the form of Exhibit 10. Reichert was therefore
entitled to introduce Exhibit "I" and argue its contents, in spite of
contentions of failure to plead breach of contract as an affirmative defense
or claim.
POINT III
There was no Error in Giving Instruction Eighteen in Place of Requested
Instruction Eight.
Regional Sales complains of error in the giving of instruction
eighteen in place of requested instruction eight. As has been previously
mentioned, Instruction eighteen was suggested by Regional Sales in the
event that number eight was not given. According to Utah law, this does
not constitute appealable error:
Under Utah law, a party on appeal may not assign
as error either the giving or failure to give an
instruction unless he first proposes correct
instructions, and should the court fail to give
them, to then except thereto.
Snyderville Transp. Co.. Inc. v. Christiansen. 609 P.2d 939 (Utah 1980).
Since Regional Sales requested replacement instruction (number
eighteen) was in fact given, there was not appealable error. The jury
verdict should therefore be allowed to stand.
Conclusion
In addition to those arguments and points previously made by
Reichert, this reply brief supplements and clarifies the issues of this appeal
in several importance regards. First, the Motion to Amend Counterclaim
was wrongfully denied by Judge Brian. It was made well in advance of
trial before Judge Brian, and did not result in prejudice since the
10

performance of Regional Sales was already contested by the original
Answer and Counterclaim. Furthermore, it contained the claim of breach
of contract, which Judge Brian did not address, but which was never before
raised in pleadings or otherwise. Second, Set off and recoupment were
proper issues before the trier of fact and addressed the very heart of
Regional Sales claims, which were denied in the Answer and Counterclaim
originally filed by Reichert. Third, the giving of Jury instruction eighteen
was not appealable error since it was the requested replacement of Regional
Sales itself. Fourth, as has been pointed out in the Statement of Facts, the
affidavit of Mr. Roe regarding attorney's fees was wholly deficient in
several important regards, as stated in the cases previously cited, including
Trayner v. Cushing. 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984), and Dixie State Bank v.
Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), which summarizes the law of Trayner
and previous cases on this point.
The Court of Appeals erred in placing itself in the stead of the trier
of fact. Again Reichert would remind this Court and counsel that the
verdict herein was a "black box" general verdict, and not a special verdict.
Therefore, the risk of substituting the appellate court's judgment
improperly for that of the trier or fact runs high. The jury verdict should
stand. If, however, this case is again remanded, Mr. Reichert should be
given the opportunity to have his day in court, to make his claims and
counterclaims, and to allow fairness and justice, to be served thereby.
Respectfully submitted this
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